Strawson’s
Individuals, pp.59-86 (23/10/2007)
Presented by Mori Hironori
SOUNDS
[1] “Claiming
a special status for one class or category of entities as opposed to others is
very common in philosophy. (…) I have been exhibiting category-preference in
claiming that material bodies are, in a certain sense, basic in relation to
other categories of particulars. But (…) there are certain ways in which
category-preference may be exhibited, in which I am not exhibiting it.”
“The meaning
given to the term ‘basic’ is strictly in terms of particular-identification. On
the other hand, I believe that the facts I have tried to indicate may underlie
and explain, if not justify, some of the more striking formulations, which I
disavow, of the category-preference which I acknowledge. It seems to me also
unobjectionable to use the expression, ‘ontologically prior’, in such a way
that the claim that material bodies are basic particulars in our conceptual
scheme is equivalent to the claim that material bodies are ontologically prior,
in that scheme, to other types of particular.”
This is true with regard to our actual
conceptual scheme, as Strawson has maintained. So he goes on to the next
subject. (p.59)
“The next
thing I want to consider is whether, and if so how, it [=our conceptual scheme]
could be otherwise.”
Strawson’s expression of the question: Could
there exist a conceptual scheme which was like ours in that it provided for a
system of objective and identifiable particulars, but was unlike ours in that
material bodies were not the particulars of the system?
This means ‘Can we make intelligible to
ourselves the idea of such a scheme?’ and ‘Could we conceive of a scheme
providing for identifiable particulars in which material bodies were not basic?’
(p.60)
“They [=two
aspects of identification] might be called the distinguishing aspect and the
reidentifying aspect. (…) Reidentification may involve merely
thinking of a particular encountered on one occasion, or thought of in respect
of one occasion, as the same as a particular encountered on another, or thought
of in respect of another. Now such thinking clearly involves
distinguishing, in thought or observation, one particular from others.” (Underlines mine)
“The
assertion that material bodies are basic particulars in our actual conceptual
scheme (cf.p.40), then, is now to be
understood as the assertion that, as things are, identifying thought about particulars other than
material bodies rests in general on identifying thought about material bodies, but not vice versa (…).”
Strawson makes a point of ‘to think’ on his
investigation (pp.60-61).
“[E]ach of us
can think identifyingly about
particulars without talking about them.”
“[W]e may,
without prejudging it, raise a more general question about the
conditions of the possibility of identifying thought about particulars.”
Strawson imposes one limit on its generality
(p.61).
“In one’s own
identifying thought (…) about particulars, one can certainly recognize
a certain distinction: viz. the distinction between those particular
occurrences, processes, states or conditions which are experiences or states of
consciousness of one’s own (cf.p.46),
and those particulars which are not experiences or states of consciousness of
one’s own, or of anyone else’s either, though they may be objects of such
experiences.”
“I intend it
[=my general question] as a question about the conditions of the
possibility of identifying thought about particulars distinguished by the
thinker from himself and from his own experiences or states of mind, and
regarded as actual or possible objects of
those experiences.”
‘objective particulars’ = abbr. of ‘particulars
distinguished by the thinker &c.’
An indication of the line of enquiry Strawson
has in mind through two questions (p.62).
1). What are the
most general statable conditions of knowledge of objective particulars?
2). Do these most
general conditions involve the requirement that material bodies should be the
basic particulars, or is this simply a special feature of our own scheme for
knowledge of objective particulars?
Running the two questions into one:
3). [I]s the
status of material bodies as basic particulars a necessary condition of
knowledge of objective particulars?
And Strawson begins an experiment by reasoning
(p.63).
“I suggest
that we inquire whether there could be a scheme which provided for objective
particulars, while dispensing with outer sense and all its representations.”
[2] Strawson declares the character of this
chapter (p.64).
“[T]he present chapter acts in part as a
bridge between the first and the third.”
[3] Strawson shows afresh the point of his
experiment by reasoning (p.64).
1).
What does the suggestion that we explore the
No-Space world amount to?
2).
What is it to imagine ourselves dispensing with
our sense?
Five senses: taste, smell, sight, hearing and touch
(pp.64-65).
“Of these,
taste and smell are strikingly more trivial than the others (…).”
“[I]t seems
no less certain that we can also discover at least some spatial features of
some things by hearing.”
Strawson considers sounds. His conclusion is as
follows (pp.65-66).
“A purely
auditory concept of space (…) is an impossibility.”
“I shall take
it as not needing further argument that in supposing experience to be purely
auditory, we are supposing a No-Space world.”
“I select the
idea of a purely auditory universe as one that is relatively simple to handle,
and yet has a certain formal richness.”
Strawson presents the next complex question
(p.66).
“Could a
being whose experience was purely auditory have a conceptual scheme which
provided for objective particulars?”